Wars are immediate events filled with noise, smoke, death, and the discontinuity of history. They obscure realities. Conflict stems from human error, misperception, greed, and accident. Too often historians provide complex rational explanations for decisions and events where the reality had none. Whatever the subsequent clarifications of past events, the participants made their decisions based on the available information. The purveyers of that information provide an essential source of data, facts, and analysis to these decision-makers. For armies, basic sources of news and insight are the military attaches -the quiet, unobtrusive, soldier-diplomats who collect and circulate information, intelligence, and opinion for the edification of their peers and superiors. They are members of every ambassadorial staff and must participate in numerous social functions, understand the activities, directions, and thoughts of the host military leaders; maintain their personal and professional careers; and provide their superiors with cautions and explanations of events. Attaches possess an extraordinary responsibility and are not always honored by their colleagues
latter would live under needed controls 11 . At the same time Fuqua used this confusion as opportunity to organize an information gathering system. In the absence of their colleagues, Wendelin and Fuqua became the major sources of information for American policy makers at home. Fuqua's experience at the highest command level of the army provided him with an understanding and insight well beyond that of his fellow attaches. His three years of service in Spain also provided him an extensive network of sources. Given that background, Fuqua organized a coordinated informational system. He did not differentiate between the rebels and the government partisans, nor did he take a personal position. In all cases he quickly discussed issues with people in the business, commercial, and political life of Madrid as a casual observer who was fascinated with the drama unfolding around him. Fuqua also drew on his familiar contacts with representatives of Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, and Portugal, who provided additional information. As a continuing network he utilized the American journalists, who flocked to Madrid in large numbers. Given their intelligence, money, and lust for news, they provided valuable data and leads. Fuqua organized a high-powered radio station that could listen to every Spanish station. All of this flow of material was recorded on Fuqua's maps which covered the walls of his room. Unlike his fellow attaches Fuqua employed agents for »feeling the pulse of the people of the streets«. Those individuals, paid by special funds, visited different sections of Madrid where they spoke with the people about pre-determined issues 12 . In sum, Fuqua had organized an exemplary intelligence center.
Building on his network of observation and knowledge, Fuqua developed a careful reporting system to keep track of the changes in the uprising. He suggested in August that the struggle would be long and savage. He believed that the rebels, despite their early successes, had wasted too much time. More to the point was the emotional involvement of the people and the offsetting strengths of the two sides. Fuqua was staggered by the cruelties and barbarous behavior exhibited by the combatants. He reported that each side sought the annihilation rather that the subjugation of the other party. Through personal observation and the reports of trusted sources he documented the atrocities of rebel and government forces. Neither side gave quarter. While Fuqua proposed that this desire to exterminate anyone of opposing view came from the earlier political campaigns, he added his own anticipation of a general slaughter of non-combatants. Excess would rule actions. The hatred would not spare anyone -young or old, male or female, soldier or civilian 13 . This civil war would be total!
The same emotionalism impacted on the division of forces. The rebels had the support of tradition, order, history, institutions, and the representatives of the military, economic, and clerical elite. On the other side were the extremists with their pathological concerns of fascism and a conservative overthrow of the Republic. These groups battled among themselves as much as they fought the rebels. With the angry masses they had formed an emotional coalition held together by hatred and fear. This division held true in the military units. The rebels had the experienced, trained, and committed officer corps but lacked the corresponding enlisted strength. The officers could plan and direct operations which their ill-trained, uncertain soldiery could neither understand nor implement. The low morale of the enlisted personnel, and their susceptibility to propaganda, made them suspect in any case. The troops from Africa would be a superior force and make a difference, but Fuqua was uncertain about their ability to win by themselves.
The government units provided a motley array of experiences. Divided into Independent Socialist, Communist, Syndicalist, and Anarchist militia, they had little more than their hatred of the rebels and desire for social revolution to sustain them. In point of fact the government troops suspected professional officers, and often shot experienced people rather than trust them. The result was an extensive reliance on sincere amateurs; a risky gamble in Fuqua's opinion. With luck and time circumstances would select the best of this group but at some cost in human life 14 . The government had not had an auspicious beginning but it would improve. Fuqua's concerns proved correct in terms of events. The government slowly took shape when Largo Caballero emerged as a coalition political leader. At the same time Fuqua believed that the new regime would fight the rebels hard without saving the Republic. The need to arm and equip the people allowed the growth of dissident formations, each with a private agenda certain to bring future difficulties. Nonetheless the government created a greater sense of purpose and focus. Using the old 1916 French slogan at Verdun, »They shall not pass«, the radicals threw their poorly formed units into the battle. While these government troops suffered grievous losses they demonstrated their presence, determination, and willingness to sacrifice their lives. In mid-September 1936, Fuqua took the balance of the civil conflict raging about him. He suggested that this earlier estimate of impass had come to reality. The rebels, now under the firm control of General Francisco Franco, had taken sufficient territority, arms, and initiative to ensure continuity, if not success. They had effectively cut off government communications with the Atlantic Ocean, captured the major materiel depots, and successfully initiated the transfer of troops from Africa. Clearly they had also obtained the support of the officer corps, and an important number of mainland troops, while controlling the same percentage of the population as the government forces. For the moment the nationalists set the tone for the conflict, since they possessed a better organization, leadership, and a coherent cause.
Fuqua thought that the government, clearly fragmented at the start, had survived the opening challenge. By mid-September the radical leadership had undertaken some limited preparation for the conflict but still required more time. The government had overwhelming popular support, control of Madrid, funds for arms purchases, and a powerful cause in combating Fascism. A basic difficulty for the government was a lack of trust and organization among themselves. The groups had unity in their hate of their foes; which also included their associates. Their lack of collective purpose, leadership structure, training, trust, and discipline precluded any military efficiency 15 . In reality, Fuqua observed, the government troops served under newly created officers who obtained their training at the front. The result was chaos in the short term. Given the activities and relative positions of the two foes Fuqua concluded that circumstances forced the government into a defensive posture while the rebels pursued limited offensive operations. He believed that Franco's forces would eventually win, but not quickly. They lacked the will and opportunity for an all-out aggressive effort 16 .
In an effort to see for himself Fuqua visited the front lines on September 17. In particular he made a special trip to observe the government siege of the Alcazar. Although the battle was momentarily quiet he noted the obvious ferocity of the action, the rebel domination in the air, and the government troops' organizational difficulties. Fuqua, despite his heart concerns, was totally involved in the crisis. He and Wendelin often stood on top of the International Telephone and Telegraph building and watched the ferocious struggle. Once Fuqua took a French attache on one of his forays to the combat zone of the University district. As they climbed to the fifth floor roof of a building for observation purposes, a sudden rebel attack occupied the two lower floors while the loyalists fiercely defended the upper stories. Eventually the latter seized control and the two observers could leave their precarious position -an exhilerated American and a concerned Frenchman who refused all subsequent invitations 22 . At the time of this incident Fuqua noted that the government efforts in helping morale and confidence were making progress despite the administrative transfer to Valencia 23 .
Madrid was the issue and made the decision.
For the Americans this concern obviated future observation acitivities. 25 . He understood that the seemingly certain result had adjusted to a more balanced conflict which would require more time for decision. The defenders possessed far more resolution than Fuqua had anticipated at the beginning, while Franco had less understanding of his success. One side could not achieve a cohesive unity, while the other side could not achieve risk and decision 26 .' The Civil War would continue.
The battle strained through November and into December. The weather, supply shortages, and physical exhaustion brought pause. During that period, Franco shifted his forces to encircling operations around Madrid 27 . He believed that a rebel swing to the northeast would allow a better investment of the city. The government forces were showing greater combat effectiveness while the rebels were misusing their strength. Because of his uncertain health and this uncertain situation, Fuqua turned to a newly arrived assistant, Captain Townsend Griffiss, for help with the question of airpower 28 .
The two men agreed quickly on the evolution of government strength. Slowly the militia, at great human cost, were becoming better soldiers. The soldiery lacked trust in their variegated political leadership but the common foe had created an uneasy coalition which time and experience had bonded into an increasingly meaningful force 29 .
While Fuqua recovered his health, the Insurgents captured Malaga in the south on February 8. He was quick to evaluate the success which brought the Nationalists extensive booty, a fine Mediterranean harbor, a rich agricultural area, and a shorter fighting line. Fuqua believed that the government disaster stemmed from the continuing problems of uneven discipline, poor coordination, and uncertain direction. In and around Madrid there was military progress, but elsewhere the government paid a high price for local, independent political views 30 . Fuqua understood these events but his health slowed his proactive stance which did hurt his anticipatory skills. Like so many observers he missed the major adjustment of the campaign -the Battle of Guadalajara. Starting on March 8, 1937, the Nationalists mounted a major offensive against that city. They believed that capturing Guadalajara would close Madrid's supply lines to the east and complete the investment of the capital. Initially the attackers surprised the defenders who retreated in disorder. For five days the operation moved smoothly.
Suddenly, on March 13, the government forces counter-attacked in force and halted the Francoists. For three days the savage weather and human exhaustion delayed operations but, on March 18, the Republicans hammered the Italians with a surprise assault. Using aircraft, tanks, the International Brigades, and an unexpected efficiency, they routed the Italians. Within days the government troops had recovered the lost territory and had their first major victory. Fuqua discounted much of the government's propaganda as rhetoric, but he recognized the reality of success. When he toured the area on April 1, he observed the captured equipment and the obvious Italian flight. As well he spoke with many Italian prisoners-of-war. Fuqua reported the crushing defeat as the product of Italian over-confidence, limited combat experience, poor training, and nonexistent coordination with Spanish units. What mattered to Fuqua was the government's obvious improvement, the battlefield success, and the blunting of the rebel offensive. Morale, so low after the fall of Malaga, had soared in the other direction 31 .
The conflict had made an important turn in the road. Fuqua's subsequent evaluation of the Civil War used the aftermath of Guadalajara as a base. He envisaged a stalemate. The government had finally survived its inauspicious beginnings and had halted the rebels. While the loyalists did not display an aggressive spirit for »open warfare«, they had sufficient strength for a dogged defense. As well the new spirit had spared Caballero's authority. With this moral cement he could meet the immediate challenge, could refuse all foreign mediation, and could fight to the final decision. The victory had given the centralized authority a measure of prestige 32 . He found the government's position akin to a tightly wound spring which held together well under direct pressure but could not maintain its temper indefinitely. Time still served Franco 33 .
After absorbing the realities of a prolonged conflict, the two sides required new concepts or directions. Following a brief pause both sides shifted their emphasis. The Nationalists moved away from Madrid in favor of occupying the other areas of Spain. They could slowly squeeze everything down to Madrid and seize the prize at the end. The government concentrated its attention on Madrid and on operations to relieve the pressure on the city. On April 9 loyalist units attacked along the Madrid front. The following day they channeled the assault into specific zones. Thereafter they committed many new formations and much of their airpower. Fuqua understood the shift of emphasis. Neither party could dominate the war and, therefore, sought a measure of local control as a base for future operations. For propaganda, diplomacy, and survival each side required victories -real or contrived! In Fuqua's eyes the change was meaningful. While the one party struggled to keep Madrid in the forefront, the other had turned away for other goals, which Fuqua envisaged as the capture of Bilbao and the Bay of Biscay. He believed that the latter concept provided a more important goal in the long run than the former defensive idea. The objectives were different, despite the common goal of Madrid, but the Nationalist approach had greater strategic import as opposed to the tactical loyalist direction 34 .
Time aided Fuqua's health problem and he resumed his visits to the front lines. In late May 1937 he noted the quietude of the Madrid front. The government attacks had made limited gains and relieved pressure points but had achieved no significant results. Occasional bombing missions and sporadic artillery fire provided indications of danger but little more. The physical damage was great but the military adjustment remained small. During this period German aircraft almost obliterated Guernica. Fuqua carefully examined the conflicting claims but concluded that the Loyalists had followed the wanton Nationalist destruction with their own mischief. He believed that history would determine the ultimate responsibility. Even so the bombing provided yet another sad event reflecting the changing nature of war 35 . The emotionalism and excesses of the early days had become accepted practice. As he reflected on the moral decay Fuqua also commented again on the developing war. He observed that the government forces lacked any basic unity, suffered a trench warfare addiction, and worried more about the future than the present 36 . The Loyalists were holding on but suffered wild swings in morale, uncertain purpose, and limited commitment at critical moments. Fuqua perceived these generalizations as pivotal issues. The government forces possessed numbers, modern materiel and equipment (largely Russian), courage, stamina, and a glimpse of offensive spirit. The blooding of combat had added much to the confidence of the survivors. This program remained at the lower command levels without reaching the higher echelons. The lack of a clear organizational structure, as well as the leadership required for that system, inhibited effective use of the military force. Nonetheless, Fuqua wondered about the Nationalists who, despite their early victories, seemed doubtful about their superiority. Security concerns, combat fatigue, and uncertain confidence provided doubts about their willingness to risk or to genuinely pursue the victory so close to their grasp. Fuqua concluded that Franco had fallen prey to German and Italian support. In the beginning the rebels needed their own resources but, by mid 1937, this foreign materiel underpinning had, seemingly, come to dominate Nationalist thinking and confidence. Fuqua confessed that the war's ultimate outcome was less clear to him than in his earlier reports 37 .
Immediate visits to the front did not alter this opinion. The two sides traded shells, bombs, and limited forays, but altered nothing. There was neither imagination nor creativity in a situation replicating the First World War. Fuqua proposed that the Loyalists remained believers in the idea that survival would eventually create the circumstances for victory. He considered such thinking as fallacious and, ultimately, fatal 38 .
At the same time Fuqua chafed over his inability to visit the North where the Nationalists were moving on Bilbao. The rebels mounted a strong, cleverly structured, and nicely coordinated assault on June 12 against that city, and, in a week-long operation occupied it. The blow to the government was great. Because of its natural defenses, the city had never fallen to siege and its seemingly easy loss to the Insurgents brought recriminations. Fuqua could only confess his surprise at the rapid victory and distress for depending on miscellaneous observers and various government sources. He understood the impact of Bilbao's loss to the Republic, and the emotional impact on the Basque people 39 . The war had made a sudden lurch in favor of Franco.
The immediate government response was more draconian measures for discipline among the troops and increasing propaganda about Bilbao's loss 40 . Such efforts obscured the reality for a brief time but required prompt action before the public understood the total impact. Fuqua anticipated a government operation around Madrid as quickly as possible. It was essential as a counter-point to the Bilbao disaster. On July 6, Loyalist units advanced on Brunete as a way of relieving the northern pressure. That the 60 000 man assault force achieved some progress amazed Fuqua. Talk of the operation had filled the cafes and meeting places in Madrid and Valencia and the information should have reached the insurgents many times. Fuqua believed that the Brunete effort might delay Franco's northern effort but could not prevent its ultimate success 41 . The outcome sustained Fuqua's opinion. He found the Spanish soldiers extraordinarily courageous and long-suffering but the government could not provide the organizational structure and command independence required for success. As the Brunete battle ground to a halt, Fuqua once more suggested changes in the military balance.
A year of combat forced adjustments in the political and military leadership 42 . Propaganda helped keep some stability but shifted abruptly under the influence of military fortune. Fuqua observed press gangs visiting restaurants at mealtimes to inspect everyone's papers. For suspicious individuals a visit to a local military headquarters was certain 43 . He believed that the Republic was losing its fighting spirit.
In continuing his visits along the combat zone, he could see the cost of the Brunete offensive -massive destruction and disheartened people. There would be no immediate Republican activity in the area 44 . Brunete brought some terrain advantages but the cost in manpower and equipment made the victory a dubious one.
Fuqua then suffered another period of uneasy health. This interruption prevented his observing the northern front where he anticipated a Nationalist operation. On August 14, Franco's forces began their assault on Santander. Again the attackers demonstrated an impressive combined arms assault of air, artillery, tanks and infantry against the out-manned defenders. The rebels broke through and captured 60 000 prisoners-ofwar. They paused briefly before pushing forward again. On October 26 they completed their occupation of northern Spain. The final conquest of this area brought much booty, further shortened Franco's lines, and gave increased impetus to the Nationalist cause. Fuqua believed that this victory was the decisive one and that warsaddened Spain wanted peace. Given the government's stringent controls these opinions were quiet but, he insisted, widespread 45 .
In the aftermath of this victory both sides slowed operations and prepared for the future. The transfer of the Spanish government from Valencia to Barcelona at the end of October brought a shift of locale for the following American representatives as well; one which complicated Fuqua's assignment. Along with his own transfer he observed the government struggling with economic and military reorganization, calling up new conscripts to replace losses, and issuing wild propaganda claims about success. Fuqua suggested that the sudden activity in so many areas suggested an impending major action 46 . He added the idea that government security was good and that no one anticipated an offensive. To the contrary he proposed that the situation was so quiet that popular rumor hinted of an armistice. Even the government seemed to support this idea by providing slogans like »Hold your trenches during the winter and victory will come to you in the spring.« The image was defensive.
At the same time Fuqua noted the government massing reserves in the Teruel sector of the front. He could see that this shift included the best units, which augured a major adjustment 47 . At first he believed that the shift reflected a defensive adjustment since
Franco's radio stations trumpeted their coming offensive. Franco obviously enjoyed a marked superiority in shock forces, guns, and materiel growing out of his northern success 48 .
On December 15, in miserable weather and without marked preparation, the government opened a major attack on Teruel. Like everyone else Fuqua knew surprise. The offensive began a week before the announced Nationalist undertaking. Employing their surprise the Loyalists drove the Nationalists hard and laid siege to Teruel. While the defenders fought with tenacity, they could not win against the brutal weather (-16° C) and a determined enemy and surrendered on January 8, 1938. Fuqua understood that the action did not alter territorial issues nor his opinions but it did matter significantly in demonstrating the government's offensive ability in brutal weather conditions 49 .
Franco opened a relief expedition but could not do more than fire random artillery shells in support of the doomed garrison. His major effort to retake Teruel on January 17 brought on an desparate battle. Fuqua visited the area shortly thereafter. Rebel planes forced him from his car often and kept him awake at night. He found the city a mass of ruins hindering human passage. The looting and destruction of all utilities and absence of civilians gave the city an unreal appearance which artillery and aerial bombardment made real. Fuqua admitted to »defensive tactics« which were »quite elemental in character and, under the first primal law of nature, forced us into positions not always too dignified«. The defenders seemed dispirited and uncertain; the earlier »They shall not pass« spirit of Madrid did not pervade Teruel. The real issue to Fuqua was the spoiling nature of the government attack. Clearly Franco enjoyed the upper hand but the loyalists had destroyed his basic design and had won several months of quietude for their efforts 50 . The struggle had reached momentarily impasse which would last some weeks.
Both sides poured resources into the battle. On February 22 the Nationalists re-entered the remains of Teruel. Fuqua recorded the entire battle in careful description. He believed that the government had delayed Franco's plans without changing the reality 51 .
The issues of military strength, popular support and international concern were the basic concerns. Weather and exhaustion made for relative calm. This moment did not last long because the communists mounted an internal upheaval, on March 6, against their own regime. They failed, but demonstrated the region's difficulties 52 . The war was now moving towards a final direction, if not a conclusion. In early March, the Nationalists opened a local offensive in Aragon but Fuqua argued quickly that the rebels enjoyed superiority in too many areas. In his professional sense of purpose the Loyalists were superior to the defenders in organization, command, equipment, maneuver, and teamwork. The attack proved that the rebels were fast establishing their superiority over their foes 53 .
Fuqua believed that battlefield developments and nationalist progress had permanently pushed the Republican forces into a defensive posture. The growing issue was the popular desire for peace and the government's ability to postpone that pressure while maintaining the struggle 54 . The ultimate conclusion was now clear, albeit the time for decision and the possibility of a miracle or international reprieve clouded the issue. Fuqua pointed out the omnipresent »trekkers«, the refugees moving between the war zones, as a major symbol of suffering and exhaustion. The conflict would grind to a bloody end but the rationale for continuance was more emotional than intellectual 55 .
While the raison d' etre for the civil war had not changed appreciatively, the goals, the assumptions, the realities were not the same. The conflict had become an end in itself. The subsequent weeks reflected that view. Franco's units began a steady, unspectacular advance; they were in no hurry. The government had neither the ideas nor the strength to effectively contest the issue. Fuqua reported the military realities; i. e., Franco's troops enjoyed too many professional advantages over their enemies. As the time passed, he suggested that the »plodding thoroughness« of the »Generalissimo« would inevitably win but that the »manana« mentality of the Spaniards made predictions dubious 56 . The major thrust was south of the Ebro River towards the Mediterranean.
On April 15 the attackers reached the coast and developed a wide corridor dividing the government's agricultural and industrial support systems. This severence into two segments would have real and harsh impacts on the loyalist's viability and freedom of action 57 .
Thereafter the struggle shifted into local actions which cost both sides many lives without appreciable territorial gain. Fuqua visited the two combat zones in May and June, noting his use of a British destroyer, H. M. S. Grenville , to reach southern Spain. In that area he found a growing pessimism and cynicism among the populace. They labored with their daily chores but wanted an end to war. Whatever their side, peace was better than destruction. Fuqua enjoyed seeing Madrid again but he could see the destruction everywhere. In moving about, he quickly discovered the Nationalist control of the air which forced him into innumerable hide-and-seek exercises. He complained that he had never experienced such intense disturbance 58 .
The government slogan, »Resistance now, to conquer later«, rallied the undaunted Loyalist troops. Fuqua marveled at this ability to survive grave defeats and to continue their resistance under impossible circumstances. As well he found their skill in building their defensive lines worth reporting. These defensive abilities had precluded a major breakthrough and a war of movement, but brought delay more than success 59 . On July 25, 1938 the Loyalists started a spoiling attack along the Ebro River. They achieved some local surprise and crossed the river using small boats confiscated along the beaches of Barcelona. While they managed to occupy the important high ground, they The bitterly cold weather hampered progress and provided a harsher human challenge than the physical defenses. Cheadle noted quickly the lack of diversionary activities, the lack of materiel for any efforts, the materiel gaps. He was impressed by the attacker's coordination, systematic approach, and obvious confidence. Franco wanted Catalonia, and Cheadle predicted success 66 . The offensive moved steadily forward with impressive military efficiency. Clearly the Nationalists had attained the necessary military abilities. By mid-January, 1939, the Loyalists were in full retreat and without hope. The government could not rescue the situation and the retirement turned into a rout. Franco did not let up on the pressure and his troops moved into Barcelona on January 26, sealing the fate of Catalonia and the war. Cheadle had accompanied his diplomatic colleagues who shifted their activities to the U. S. Omaha on January 23, 1939, and, from that transitory station to Perpignan, France. He tried to recross the frontier but the massive refugee wave prevented all transit. The conflict was coming to an end 67 . Cheadle would be on the sideline. The longanticipated Franco victory was close. On the one hand, the booty in Catalonia gave the Nationalists more materiel for victory, and on the other hand, the governments' inability to find replacements, destroyed any survival hopes 6S .
Given his location in France, Cheadle could use only the resources at hand which meant newspapers, rumor, and human exchanges. He could visit refugee camps but they provided limited insight into Spain's circumstances 69 . He could summarize the events but neither analyze nor comment on them. The world was turning upside down. As a distant observer he could analyze and chronicle the final death throes of the Republic but no more. The Madrid upheavals, the Nationalist offensive, the fall of the capital were observer acitivies for him. Still, he could suggest, »This war, which lasted for 969 days, has been one of the longest, bloodiest, costliest, and most brutal internicene 71 struggles of modern history.« Fuqua and, to a lesser extent Cheadle, had observed a brutal modern civil war. Their reports had reached an extensive audience and had impacted upon American military thought. They provided the information, the insights, the trends, the data concerning an international testing ground. This struggle, the first international conflict since the First World War, came at a generational and technilogical watershed in military affairs. The individuals who had served in responsible positions during that earlier conflict were fading into sinecures or retirement while the junior officers (who had chafed under earlier restraints) were moving into leadership roles. Concurrently the technological and scientific advances had reached middle stages of conception, design, testing, and production which reflected the lessons of the First World War while anticipating the new machines and designs of future conflict. The Spanish Civil War was unique in its timing, its location, its education, and its participation. In a major sense the First World War concluded a century of development without, in the decisive format of the French Revolution, a replacement ideology. For several years thereafter the world wallowed in uncertainty. The issues in Asia suggested a catalytic adjustment; the civil war provided a direction for European militarists.
In this sense Fuqua's role was unique. He was present at the transfer between a past which he had experienced and a future which he anticipated too clearly. Beyond the command areas of the Army, this informational flow reached every military level in the Army command. The Army War College followed the conflict carefully, largely through Colonel Bryon Q. Jones, who structured, maintained and directed the institutional interest in the Spanish conflict. He organized a special committee of the College in 1937-38 to observe the conflict in detail. His records demonstrated his methodical approach to the issue 72 . The six-man committee studied the conflict via the available materials and reported to the War Department on January 24, 1938. They divided their presentation into subcommittee reports. The first one dealt with the origins of the civil war and the nature of the foreign involvement. The second group reported on weapons development, tactical changes, and innovative techniques. In particular this latter study considered on the effective use of airpower against ground forces, the need for antiaircraft artillery, and the failure of light tanks. The report made strong recommendations concerning the future of warfare 73 .
At the Command and General Staff School in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Civil War's impact came through lectures rather than via curricular adjustment. Unfortunately, although these oral materials have largely disappeared from the written record, some copies of those discussions were put in the War Department reference file. They were largely descriptive and suggested the growing complexity of modern war. At the same time the speakers underscored the changes from earlier considerations. Roads had assumed an equal importance with railroads; night movements of supplies, units, etc., had undergone change; propaganda had provided a new aspect; and coordinated arms operations had entered a new dimension. The defensive role in combat had become superior to the offensive. Such ideas offered a change in future conceptualization without real impact on the structure. These observations also carried the names of individual observers/reporters in Spain as well as elsewhere 74 .
The Air Corps monitored developments by reviewing Fuqua's and Griffiss' reports, doing internal studies (largely, but not exclusively, by students), and providing information to interested parties. These activities centered in the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Alabama. By the nature of the curriculum and the desultory nature of the various reports, one can deduce that the Spanish Civil War had limited impact on Air Corps thinking 75 .
A future influence on thought was the publication of details, observations, and reflections in journal articles. These general, analytical pieces filled the print media. They reflected the views of the professional community who understood the ideas and changes. The number of issues was unclear because so many individuals pursued their personal careers within the emotional milieu of the times. The concerns were both unclear and emotional. The most authoritive, best informed, and most prolific analyst was Captain Wendell G. Johnson who established a long, careful publication record. His articles filled many journals 76 .
Throughout the Spanish Civil War the American Army enjoyed the benefits of a fine observer, Colonel Stephen O. Fuqua. He kept his superiors and, through them, his peers informed about the new tactics, equipment, and changes in warfare and was an astute and careful recorder of those developments. While his name does note appear in many books, his reports helped influence military thought and the direction of the United Staates Army at a critical moment in its development.
